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LATENT DEFECTS IN HOME CONSTRUCTION: THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT REDEFINES LEGAL
OPTIONS FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
PURCHASER
Redarowicz v. Ohlendor,
92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E. 2d 324 (1982)
LAWRENCE

R.

PILON,

1984*

"'Hethat builds a fair house upon an ill seat committeth himself to
prison." Francis Bacon, ESSAYS (1625)

In the time between Francis Bacon's admonition and the early part
of the twentieth century, the remedies available in contract law for actions by a home's initial purchaser against the builder-vendor for latent
construction defects became substantially limited by the doctrines of
caveat emptor,' substantial performance, 2 and merger. 3 Underlying
* B.M.E., Music Education, Illinois State University, 1975; Candidate for J.D., ChicagoKent College of Law, 1984.
1. "Let the buyer beware. This maxim summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine,
judge, and test for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., Mercer v.
Meinel, 290 Ill. 395, 125 N.E. 288 (1919). The doctrine of caveat emptor prevented the buyer from
complaining after the sale that an item did not meet the buyer's standards, because the buyer had
been given the opportunity to inspect the item prior to purchase. The doctrine was generally
applied to the sale of finished homes, although a minority of jurisdictions followed the English
lead in Miller v Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931), and allowed an exception for a
contract on an unfinished home sometimes known as the Miller exception. See, e.g., Hoye v.
Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958). For a general discussion of caveat
emptor's application in sales of homes, see Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent
Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961)(hereinafter cited as Bearman); Jaeger, The
Warranty of Habitability, Part11, 47 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1970)(hereinafter cited as Jaeger 11); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer. The Housing Merchant DidIt, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835, 835-837 (1967)(hereinafter cited as Roberts). For a history of the doctrines development
as the product of nineteenth-century judicial laissez-faire, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1178-1187 (1931).
2. "Honestly and faithfully" performed "material and substantial" particulars, but with
"technical or unimportant omissions or defects." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
The contract doctrine of substantial performance protects a party who has failed to perform a
constructive condition to the contract, but not to an extent so as to be considered a material breach
of the contract. The party failing to perform in this way is still considered to be in breach of the
contract and liable for damages which flow therefrom. However, the party is protected from the
possibility of cancellation of the contract and retention of the (immaterially flawed) property
which could otherwise flow from a failure of a condition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 235-241 (1981), CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §§ 11-22 (2d ed.
1977). The doctrine has found important application in building contracts because of the perceived inequity of allowing the buyer to default on payment, while retaining possession of the
building, because of the builder's "technical or unimportant omissions or defects." See, e.g., Joray
Mason Contractors, Inc. v. Four J's Constr. Corp., 61 Ill. App. 3d 410, 378 N.E.2d 328 (2d Dist.
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these doctrines in part was the "ethic of self-reliance," i.e., the attitude
that the builder-vendor and the initial purchaser dealt with each other
at arm's length as equally knowledgeable, capable business partners
who could adequately protect their respective interests in the bargain.
The initial purchaser's protection from defective construction was expected to come more from his or her own knowledge, experience, and
4
self-interest than from the courts.
The subsequent purchaser of a defectively constructed home who
desired to recover against the builder for latent construction defects
stood in an even weaker legal position than the initial purchaser. The
builder, whose construction techniques created or incorporated the latent defect, was no longer the vendor. Thus, the subsequent purchaser
could not show privity of contract with the builder,5 and this lack of
contractual privity generally blocked recovery in contract law. 6 To circumvent the privity problem, the subsequent purchaser often turned to
tort theories of recovery, particularly negligence. 7 However, recovery
in negligence carried its own obstacles. A number of courts found that
the builder owed no duty of reasonable care to subsequent purchasers. 8
1978); J-M Builders & Supplies Corp. v. McIntyre, 56 Ill. App. 3d 714, 372 N.E.2d 420 (2d Dist.
1978); Brink v. Hayes Branch Drainage Dist., 59 11. App. 3d 828, 376 N.E.2d 78 (4th Dist. 1978).
Cf. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 626, 368 N.E.2d 1044 (2d Dist. 1977),
affPd, 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979)(builder did not substantially perform and thus had no
right to insist that buyer perform); Brewer v. Custom Builders Corp., 42 Ill. App. 3d 668, 356
N.E.2d 565 (5th Dist. 1976).
3. Under the law of real property doctrine of merger, all conditions in the sales contract
(such as an implied warranty of a home's fitness) are considered merged into the deed when the
deed is executed. Thus a condition does not survive as an independent promise after the deed's
execution unless expressly made as a collateral undertaking. This would exclude implied conditions such as an implied warranty of fitness or habitability. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman
Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979), aff'g, 53 Ill. App. 3d 626, 368 N.E.2d 1044 (2d
Dist. 1977); Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (3d Dist. 1963), afid, 31 111.
2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964). See generally Jaeger 11, supra note 1, at 28-29.
4. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 10-1, at 348 (2d ed. 1977). The
harsh effect of all of these doctrines is discussed in some detail by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
5. See, e.g., Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 111.App. 3d
951, 435 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist. 1982); Kramp v. Showcase Builders, 97 Ill. App. 3d 17, 422 N.E.2d
958 (2d Dist. 1981); Mellander v. Killeen, 86 Ill. App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist. 1980).
6. Attempts to recover in contract without privity between the builder and the subsequent
purchaser typically argued the subsequent purchaser as a third-party beneficiary to the contract
between the builder and the initial purchaser. See, e.g., Waterford Condominium Ass'n v. Dunbar Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 371, 432 N.E.2d 1009 (1st Dist. 1982); Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 85 111.2d
44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 Ill. App. 3d
951, 435 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist. 1982); Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium,
Inc., 406 So.2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M.
123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 Ill. App. 3d
at 957-58, 435 N.E.2d at 214-15; Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 95 Ill. App. 3d 444, 447, 420 N.E.2d
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Even if a duty was found to exist, there were serious evidentary
problems associated with establishing the builder's breach of duty.9
Moreover, because the builder's work had been completed and accepted by both the initial and subsequent purchasers, the accepted
work doctrine' ° could block the subsequent purchaser's recovery
against the builder in negligence. The subsequent purchaser could of
course sue the initial purchaser and let the initial purchaser bring an
action against the builder-vendor, but in practice the initial purchaser
often proved an unsuitable defendant." The initial purchaser was a
non-commercial seller who was even less likely than the builder to
have known of latent construction defects. If brought into court, the
initial purchaser, like the builder, found the court quick to invoke the
caveat emptor and doctrine of merger protections, and unwilling to find
2
implied warranties.1
Post-World War II changes in home construction and sales methods brought new changes in the courts' traditional approaches to actions against the builder-vendor for construction defects.' 3 The
development of the mass-produced, tract-style home, with its concomitant subdivision development marketing techniques based on models
and standard designs, made the law of products sales and products lia209, 211 (4th Dist. 1981) afld in part, rev'd in part, 92 111. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982). The
Foxcroft court rejected an alleged duty "to build in a reasonably workmanlike manner" owing to
future owners of the home as an attempt to recast a contract action into one in negligence so as to
avoid a dismissal for lack of privity. The Redarowicz appellate court decision is discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 72-80.
9. See, e.g., Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978)("Often the only proof will
be by inference from the result - a difficult problem where, as will often be the case, many parties
may be involved in design, providing materials and construction.") id. at 882.
10. The accepted work doctrine relieves an independent contractor from tort liability for
completed work which has been accepted by the purchaser of the independent contractor's work.
See Redarowicz, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 450-51, 420 N.E.2d at 213, reviewing the development of the
doctrine in Illinois courts.
11. See Haskell, The Casefor an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53
GEO. L.J. 633 (1965)(hereinafter cited as Haskell). For a discussion of the problem in the products
liability area created by requiring the subsequent purchasers to sue down the privity "chain," ie.,
consumer, to retailer, to wholesaler, to manufacturer, see Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1117 (1960)(hereinafter referred to as The
Assault upon the Citadel); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791, 799-800 (1966)(hereinafter referred to as The Fall ofthe Citadel).
12. See generally Haskell, supra note 11.
13. "We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions between . . . mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same."Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d
314, 325 (1965). Accord Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., I A.D. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 79
(1956)(dictum that architects and builders should be held to the same standard as automobile
manufacturers per MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.), rev'd on other grounds 3 N.Y. 2d 137, 164
N.Y.S. 2d 699 (1957); Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 36, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158
(1979). See generally, Bearman, supra note 1, at 542-43.
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bility appear more appropriate in this setting then it had in the past.' 4
The pivotal Illinois case in this regard came in 1979 with the Illinois
5
Supreme Court's decision in Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co.'
The Petersen decision recognized an implied warranty of habitability
in the sale of a new home, running from the builder-vendor to the purchaser, whereby the builder impliedly covenanted that the home was
free from latent defects which would render the home not reasonably
suited for its intended use. 16 In so holding, the Petersen court triggered
a period of reappraisal in the Illinois courts of the policies and assump7
tions underlying the law of the housing market.'
The result of this reappraisal has been both an expansion and a
reordering of the legal options in contract and in negligence available
to both initial and subsequent purchasers of defective homes in suits
against builders. In Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf,18 the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed diverging decisions in the appellate courts and announced fundamental changes in the way that Illinois courts will now
deal with construction defect litigation brought by purchasers against
builders under contract and tort theories. The Redarowicz decision
abandons the privity requirement for actions based on an implied warranty of habitability and thus extends recovery under this theory to
subsequent purchasers. At the same time, however, the Redarowicz decision bars actions in tort for home buyers who allege damages which
can be characterized as solely "economic loss."' 19
This case comment will first review the shift in recovery options
available to the home buyer on an implied warranty of habitability theory and in negligence after Petersen. It will then analyze the
Redarowicz decision and its likely impact on future litigation in Illinois
14. See generally, Roberts, supra note 1; Bearman, supra note 1;Roeser, The Implied Warranty ofHabitability in the Sale ofNew Housing- The Trend in Illinois, 1978 S. ILL. U. L.J. 178
(hereinafter referred to as Roeser).
15. 76 Ill.
2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979), affg 53 Ill. App. 3d 626, 368 N.E.2d 1044 (2d Dist.
1977).
16. Id at 40-42, 389 N.E.2d at 1158-59.
17. The Petersen decision has been cited in nearly two dozen Illinois appellate and supreme
court decisions involving actions against builders for recovery on an implied warranty of habitability. It continues to be the Illinois courts' starting point for analysis of the implied warranty in
the sale of residential property. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 111.2d at 181-82, 441
N.E.2d at 329.
18. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982),rev'g inpart, aff'g inpart 95 111.App. 3d 444, 420
N.E.2d 209 (4th Dist. 1981).
19. "Economic loss" in products liability cases is that damage which can be characterized as
loss of "benefit of the bargain" such as repair costs or diminution of value. It does not include
damages through personal injury, or accidental damage to other property, which is attributable to
the product's defect. See, e.g., Redarowicz 92 Ill.
2d at 177, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (1982); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 11. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, 449 (1982).
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over home construction defects. It will conclude that the Redarowicz

expansion of the implied warranty of habitability brings a needed, although not necessarily most appropriate, cause of action to the subsequent purchaser, but does so in a way which leaves a number of
important questions unanswered. It will further conclude that the
"economic loss" limitation placed by the Redarawicz court on negligence actions brings an unclear, inappropriate, and unnecessary doctrine into the law of real property. The result will be an arbitrary
application of questionably appropriate contract law, an unnecessary
pleading limitation for homeowners, and a potential problem for Illinois' small-time investment property owners.
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

From Petersen to Redarowicz
The Illinois Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co. established the general outline of the implied
warranty of habitability 20 applicable to the sale of a single-family home
from a builder-vendor to the original purchaser. 2' Plaintiff Petersen
contracted with the defendant construction company for the sale of a
piece of land and the construction of a home on the land, and furnished
a deposit. The home proved to be seriously flawed. The defects included an improperly pitched basement, improperly installed siding,
and numerous other defects which rendered the home habitable but
undesirable. Petersen refused to accept the home and sued for the return of the deposit. Thc trial and appellate courts found that the
builder had not substantially performed and held for Petersen. The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the lower court decisions, but not because the builder had not substantially performed. Rather, the Peter20. Prior to the Petersen decision in the Illinois Supreme Court, an implied warranty of
fitness or habitability in the sale of a home had already been allowed in the appellate courts of
three Illinois districts. See Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 I11.App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728
(lst Dist. 1962); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (3d Dist. 1972); Garcia v.
Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634 (3d Dist. 1975); Conyers v.
Molloy, 50 Il. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977); Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp.,
48 Ill. App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1977). The implied warranty of habitability had
been rejected in one district. See Narup v. Higgins, 51 11. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (5th Dist.
1964). The Petersen decision itself had been decided for the buyer at the appellate court level on
the basis of the builder's failure to substantially perform, with no mention of an implied warranty
of fitness or habitability. See Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 53 In. App. 3d 626, 368 N.E.2d
1044 (2d Dist. 1977), affd 76 IlL. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
21. The Petersen case involved a contract to build the home rather than a contract to sell it,
and thus could have invoked the Miller exception, see supra note 1. However, this distinction was
not discussed in later Illinois cases. For a discussion of the anomolous results based on this distinction, see Bearman, supra note I, at 545-47.
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sen court found that an implied warranty protected the purchaser
against latent defects which made the home not reasonably suitable for
its intended use. 22 The implied warranty arose out of the purchase
contract as an independent undertaking between the buyer and the
seller which was not merged into the deed, 23 and operated in a way
analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty of
25
merchantability, 24 and warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
The Petersen court cited Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 26 where an implied warranty of habitability was first recognized in Illinois in a landlord-tenant setting, but did not place its reliance solely on this case or
the number of decisions in other states which had already found an
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes. 27 The court
noted as well the widespread approval among the commentators for the
implied warranty of habitability as the most appropriate means of curing the injustices that caveat emptor and the doctrine of merger created
for the home buyer. 28 In the Petersen court's view, significant changes
in the housing industry had taken place which now made the applica22. 76 Ill. 2d at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158. The latent defects complained of in Petersen included an improperly pitched basement floor and improperly installed siding, windows, door, and
interior drywall. Id. at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
23. Id. at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158, citing Brownell v. Quinn, 47 Ill. App. 2d 206, 197 N.E.2d
721 (ist Dist. 1964)(an express covenant to construct in a workmanlike manner does not merge
into the deed).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-314 (1977), providing in pertinent part:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) . . .
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) . . .
(f) .
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
25.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-315 (1977) providing in pertinent part:

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the
next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
26. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
27. Cases from England and fifteen U.S. states supporting an implied warranty of fitness or
habitability in the sale of residential property were collected in Annot., 25 A.L.R. 3d 383, 413-25
(1969) cited by the Petersen court. The 1982 supplement to this annotation has added fifteen new
U.S. states.
28. 76 Ill. 2d at 38-39, 389 N.E.2d at 1157 citing Roeser, supra note 14; Bearman, supra note
1; Roberts, supra note 1; Haskell, supra note i1; Jaeger, The Warranty ofHabitability,Part 1, 46
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1969); Jaeger II, supra note 1. See also Comment, Washington's New
Home Implied Warranty of Habitabilit-Explanation and Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REV. 185
(1978).
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tion of caveat emptor and the doctrine of merger unfair to the home
buyer. 29 The modem home buyer often bought from model homes or
pre-drawn plans with neither the knowledge nor the opportunity to intelligently inspect construction. The buyer was thus obliged to rely on
the builder's integrity and skill. Furthermore, the modem home
builder had become a "mass producer" of a product held out to the
public as reasonably fit for use as a home. The Petersen court concluded that the law of sales now provided the more appropriate legal
guidelines for disputes over latent defects in the builder's "product,"
and an implied warranty of habitability was an appropriate buyer
30
protection.
Having now received the Illinois Supreme Court's approval of the
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of homes, the Illinois appellate courts quickly expanded the implied warranty's protection for the
original purchaser. Condominiums 3 1 and condominium common
areas 32 were found to be covered, as were leased single-family homes. 33
Developer-sellers were found to be potentially subject to the implied
warranty, 34 as were part-time "one-home-at-a-time"builders. 35 "Latent
defects" were found to include violations of building setback restrictions36 and septic system installation in improper soil conditions. 37
Subsequent purchasers of defectively constructed homes, however,
were denied this remedy in their suits against the builder. The Petersen
court had found the implied warranty to arise out of the builder's sales
contract, 38 but the subsequent purchaser could show no privity with the
builder. Expanding the warranty's coverage to include the subsequent
purchaser would thus require dropping what was viewed as a funda29. 76 111. 2d at 39-40, 389 N.E.2d at 1157-58.
30. Id. at 41-42, 389 N.E.2d at 1158-59. The Petersen court expressly left open questions of
how the warranty was to be applied after delivery of deed, and its applicability when the home is
built on the buyer's land for another not in privity with the builder, as when a home is built for
resale by a developer. 1d. at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
31. Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (lst Dist. 1980).
32. Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (Ist Dist. 1980).
33. Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 84 Ill. 2d 178, 417 N.E.2d 1297 (1981), rev'g inpart, aff'g in
part 78 Ill. App. 3d 361, 397 N.E.2d 539 (lst Dist. 1979).
34. Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 IU. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1st Dist. 1980).
35. Park v. Sohn, 90 II. App. 3d 794, 414 N.E.2d I (3d Dist. 1980), a'd in part, rev'd inpart,
89 Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982).
36. Id.
37. Kramp v. Showcase Builders, 97 Il. App. 3d 17, 422 N.E.2d 958 (2d Dist. 1981). The
Kramp decision distinguished pre-Petersen decisions in Conyers v. Molloy, 50 111.App. 3d 17, 364
N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977), and Witty v. Schramm, 62 II. App. 3d 185, 379 N.E.2d 333 (3d Dist.
1978), where soil conditions were not held covered by an implied warranty of habitability, as not
in keeping with the rationale and spirit of the Illinois Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Petersen.
38. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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mental requirement to recovery in contract and this expansion was re39
fused whenever the issue was presented.
THE ECONOMIC

Loss DOCTRINE

While homeowner protections against latent construction defects
were generally being expanded in the wake of Petersen under the implied warranty of habitability, protection under a negligence theory
was being restricted. Borrowing a doctrine developed in the products
liability area, 4° Illinois appellate courts barred recovery in negligence
for purchasers who had sustained solely "economic loss," i.e., repair
costs or diminution of the home's value with no accompanying per4
sonal injury or damage to other (e.g. personal) property. '
The New Jersey and California supreme courts had established
the essential arguments over the economic loss doctrine in Santor v. A.
and M Karagheusian,Inc. 42 and Seely v. White Motor Co .43 In Santor
the plaintiff purchased carpeting, manufactured by the defendant, from
a third-party distributor. The carpeting later developed unsightly lines
due to defective manufacture, and the plaintiff sued under an implied
warranty theory. The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the action in
spite of a lack of privity between the parties, and noted in dicta that
another alternative would have been to sue under strict liability in tort
theory. This theory had been found to apply where a defective product
caused personal injury or damage to other property, and there was no
reason why the manufacturer's responsibility should be any different
because the only damage was to the product sold."
In Seely the plaintiff had purchased a truck, manufactured by the
defendant, from a third-party dealer. The truck was involved in an
accident caused by defective brakes, but there was no personal injury.
39. See Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 I11. App. 3d 951,
435 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist. 1982); Mellander v. Killeen, 86 Ill. App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (4th
Dist. 1980). The question of an implied warranty of habitability as protection for a subsequent
purchaser was expressly left open by the court in Altevogt v. Brinkoetter & Co., 81 11. App. 3d
711,401 N.E.2d 1302 (4th Dist. 1980). The Altevogi implied warranty of habitability count was
held barred by the statute of limitations on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in Altevogt v.
Brinkoetter, 85 Ill. 2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (198 1), thus the Illinois Supreme Court did not get to the
question of the implied warranty's possible extension to subsequent purchasers.
40. See generally Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917 (1966). (hereinafter referred to as Economic Loss).
41. See, e.g., Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 Ill. App. 3d
951, 435 N.E.2d 210 (2d Dist. 1982); Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 InI. App. 3d 310, 415
N.E.2d 1224 (1st Dist. 1980).
42. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
43. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
44. 44 N.J. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
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The plaintiff sued under an express warranty theory to recover for the
cost of repair and replacement, and lost profits. 4 5 The California
Supreme Court allowed recovery on the warranty, and noted in dicta
that in the absence of physical injury, recovery would not be possible
under a strict liability in tort theory. The court criticized the Santor
decision, noting:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an
accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests rather, on an
understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer
must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be
held liable [in tortLforphysicalinjuries caused by defects by requiring
his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions
that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held [in tortLfor
the level ofperformance of hisproducts in the consumer's business
unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. 46
The Seely court found contract law's provisions appropriate for
dealing with the ordinary commercial risks and economic expectations
of the parties in a commercial transaction. Tort law made the manufacturer an insurer, which was appropriate for risks of personal injury
47
but not for commercial risks and economic expectations.
The Santor-Seely debate was soon taken up by the Illinois appellate courts. The economic loss doctrine was explicitly considered in
Illinois for the first time in 1977 by the second district inA/fredN. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp.48 In Koplin, the plaintiff Koplin purchased
air conditioning units, manufactured by defendant Chrysler, for its
place of business. When the air conditioning units failed, Koplin sued
for recovery of its repair and replacement costs under breach of warranty and negligence theories. 4 9 The second district found that recovery for breach of warranty was blocked by an effective warranty
disclaimer, and recovery for negligence was blocked by the economic
loss doctrine. 0 The Koplin court agreed with the California Supreme
Court's economic loss rationale in Seely, and concluded that contract
law was inherently better suited to deal with the risk of economic loss, 5 1
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
45 Cal.

63 Cal. 2d at 12-13, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20, 403 P.2d at 147-48.
Id. at 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
Id. at 19, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
49 11.App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist. 1977).
Id. at 195-96, 364 N.E.2d 101-02.
Id. at 197, 204, 364 N.E.2d at 102, 107.
Id. at 197-202, 364 N.E.2d at 102-05, relying on Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965)("A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manu-
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and had damage provisions that were more appropriate for bargain situations. 52 Allowing negligence actions to be brought by the buyer for
loss of the "benefit of the bargain" could result in an undesirable excess
of litigation and exposure of the vendor to an unreasonably high and
unforeseeable level of liability, which would unjustifiably increase
53
prices for all consumers.
However, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District
rejected the "economic loss" limitation on tort actions with its 1980
decision in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. 54 In
Moorman, the plaintiff feed processor purchased from the manufacturer a grain storage tank which developed a crack some ten years
later. 5" The feed processor filed a complaint alleging liability for the
defective tank based on strict liability in tort, misrepresentation, and
negligence, but all three of these tort counts had been dismissed by the
56
trial court because of the economic loss doctrine.
In rejecting the economic loss limitation to recovery in tort, the
appellate court took the New Jersey Supreme Court's Santor approach,
noting the doctrine's inconsistent result when identical plaintiffs, with
identically defective products, incurred different injuries. 57 If one of
facturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can,
however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations
. . "). The
. California Supreme Court's decision in Seely (opinion by Justice Traynor) is widely
cited in support of the economic loss doctrine. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641
F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1980); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. Damages in contract are limited to those which were foreseen or reasonably foreseeable
to the defendant at the time that the contract was made. This is often referred to as the "Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale" after the 1854 English case by that name, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See
CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 14-5 (2d ed. 1977). Furthermore, punitive
damages are generally not granted in contract actions. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, § 14-3 (2d ed. 1977). Neither of these limitations on recovery apply to tort actions.
See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 92 at 619-20 (1971).

53. Allowing recovery in tort for solely economic loss "in no way justifies requiring the consuming public to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers." 49 Ill.
App. 3d at 203, 364 N.E.2d at 105, citing, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
54. 92 I11. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (4th Dist.1980), modofed, 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d
443 (1982).
55. 92 Il. App. 3d at 136-37, 414 N.E.2d at 1304.
56. Id. The plaintiff was permitted by the trial court to amend its complaint to include a
fourth count alleging breach of an express warranty. This count survived a motion to dismiss as
barred by the statute of limitations (four years, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, par. 2-725 (1977))
because the trial court found the warranty to have been extended to future performance of the
tank. Id.
57. "[We reject out of hand the hollow distinction that would allow a buyer to recover the
value of an air conditioner in strict liability in tort if it has damaged his premises by leaking
(citation omitted) but deny recovery if the air conditioner has failed to cool the premises. (citation
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these plaintiffs incurred personal injury or additional property damage
as a result of the product's defect, recovery could be had in tort with its
relatively liberal allowance for damages. If the other of these plaintiff's
was "fortunate" enough to escape personal injury and additional property damage, the economic loss doctrine would bar recovery in tort.
This plaintiff would be obliged to seek recovery in contract with its
stricter limitation of damages to those which were foreseen or reasonably foreseeable at the time of the sale. Thus, the economic loss doc58
trine unfairly penalized the injury-minimizing plaintiff.
The fourth district's Moorman decision was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court where it was reversed on the question of the economic loss doctrine's applicability in Illinois courts. 59 In his majority
opinion for the supreme court, Justice Moran followed Seely and found
a logical and reasonable rationale behind the doctrine which justified
its use in product liability cases such as this one. He reasoned that
contract and tort law were each particularly appropriate for the protection of particular interests. Contract law was suited to the protection of
the plaintiff's economic expectations, whereas tort law was suited to the
protection of the plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of harm. 60 Furthermore, the two bodies of law differed in their provisions for risk
allocation, with contract law providing the appropriate mechanisms for
allocating economic risk, and tort law providing the appropriate mechanisms for allocating risk of accidental physical harm or property damage. 61 Contract law protected the seller from liability that tort law
would permit for the unforeseeable damages of subsequent purchasers. 62 Tort law would not allow a producer to limit or disclaim its own
liability, but contract law allowed for both limitations and disclaimers,
omitted)" Id. at 142-43, 414 N.E.2d at 1308, citing Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1st Dist. 1965); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler
Corp., 49 IUl. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist. 1977).
58. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 141, 414 N.E.2d at 1307.
59. 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
60. Id. at 80-81, 435 N.E.2d at 448.
61. Id. The court took particular note of sections of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted by Illinois governing parol evidence (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, par. 2-202 (1977)), express
warranties (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, par. 2-213 (1977)), implied warranties (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26,
par. 2-314 (1977)), disclaimers, (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, par. 2-316 (1977)), notice requirements on

discovery of breach, (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, par. 2-607 (1977)), limitations on the extent of liability (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, pars. 2-718, 2-719 (1977)), and the statute of limitations (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 26, par. 2-725 (1977)).
62. If a defendant were held strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss suffered by a
particular purchaser, it would be liable for business losses of other purchasers caused by
the failure of the product to meet the specific needs of their business, even though these
needs were communicated only to the dealer.
91 I11.2d at 79, 435 N.E.2d at 447; see also, id. at 88, 435 N.E.2d at 451 (applying same argument
in negligence analysis).
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and encouraged contracting parties to bargain over warranties. 63 Thus
the effect of allowing suits in tort for solely economic loss would be to
eviscerate these provisions in the comprehensive commercial law
scheme.64
For the initial purchaser of a defectively constructed home, Moorman's limitation on recovery in negligence was compensated for by the
expanded opportunities under the Petersen implied warranty of habitability. For the subsequent purchaser, however, the outlook had
dimmed. The protections of the Petersen implied warranty remained
unavailable, while tort protections under Moorman would now be restricted to only those plaintiffs who could also show resultant physical
injury or damage to other property. 65 It was in this atmosphere of
changing law and dwindling legal options that the Redarowicz dispute
arose.
REDAROWICZ V. OHLENDORF

66
Facts of the Case

In late 1975 or early 1976, the defendant Ohlendorf, doing business as Ohlendorf Builders, completed a home for the original owners.
The home was subsequently sold by the original owners to the plaintiff,
Redarowicz, approximately one year later. Shortly thereafter,
Redarowicz discovered structural defects in the home. These were
principally defects in the construction of the chimney, its foundation,
and its adjoining outer wall. 67 As a result of the construction defects,
these structural members were separating from the rest of the house,
63. Id. at 79, 435 N.E.2d at 447.
64. Id. at 79-80, 435 N.E.2d at 448.
65. Suits alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of a home's fitness had continued after Petersen whenever the particular facts of the case warranted. However, strict interpretation of pleading
requirements left home purchasers rarely able to allege the builder's knowledge of the defect or
intent to induce reliance with sufficient specificity. See, e.g., Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 794, 414
N.E.2d 1 (3d Dist. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982); Waterford Condominium Ass'n v. Dunbar Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 371, 432 N.E.2d 1009 (ist Dist. 1982).

Actions on the contract for breach of express warranties of fitness of course continued to be available to parties in privity. However, attempts by the subsequent purchaser to recover as a thirdparty beneficiary to the builder-original purchaser contract continued to be uniformly denied.
See, e.g., Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 81 Ill. App. 3d 711, 401 N.E.2d 1302 (4th Dist. 1980), aff'din
part, rev'd in part, 85 II. 2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981).

66. As a result of its treatment in the lower courts, i.e., dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action followed by an affirmance of the trial court at the appellate court level, the facts before the
Illinois Supreme Court in Redarowicz were based solely on the pleadings. Certain facts in the case
were thus at the time both undeveloped and unproven. All properly pleaded allegations were
assumed to be true, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 4.44-45, 420 N.E.2d at 209-10, citing Giers v. Anten, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 535, 386 N.E.2d 82 (1st Dist. 1978).
67. Redarowicz also alleged defective construction of the home's patio.
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admitting water into the basement and causing further damage to the
68
structure.
Redarowicz complained to the builder about these defects and notified the city. A city inspection found the defects to constitute building
69
code violations and the builder was threatened with city action.
When complaints to the builder and pressure from the city evoked
promises to repair but no repairs, Redarowicz filed suit in the Circuit

Court of McLean County. Redarowicz' six-count complaint against
the builder was grounded in both contract and tort, alleging negligent
construction of the home and patio; breach of a contract to repair between the builder and the city, with Redarowicz as a third-party beneficiary; breach of an implied warranty of habitability; fraud; and breach
70
of a contract to repair between the builder and Redarowicz.
All six counts of the complaint were dismissed with prejudice by
the trial court for failure to state a cause of action.7' Redarowicz appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District.
72
The Appellate Court Opinion

Justice Webber, writing for a 2-1 majority, approached the dismissal of Redarowicz' six counts seriatim, finding the dismissal of all but
the count pleading an express contract between Redarowicz and the
73
builder, to have been proper.
68. It may be assumed from the Illinois Supreme Court's discussion of "solely economic
damages" that Redarowicz was either able to avoid damage to personal property as a result of the
defects or did not plead these damages.
69. This is not explicitly stated by either the appellate court or the supreme court, but may be
inferred from both courts' discussions of Redarowicz' express contract with the builder, which
would have been based upon bargaining between Redarowicz and the builder over repairs, and
his recovery as a third-party beneficiary, which would have been based upon bargaining between
the city and the builder over repairs. See infra notes 73, 92, and text accompanying notes 79-80
infra.70. 95 Ill. App. 3d at 445, 420 N.E.2d at 210. This pleading of five alternative theories of
recovery for the same damages was typical of construction defects pleading in Illinois at that time.
See, e.g., Kramp v. Showcase Builders, 97 Ill. App. 3d 17, 422 N.E.2d 958 (2d Dist. 1981)(plaintiff
pleaded alternative theories of recovery in fraud, implied warranty of habitability and negligence).
All five theories pleaded in Redarowicz are discussed in some detail in Jaeger II, supra note 1.
71. The trial court's reasoning and support is not given in either the appellate court's or the
supreme court's decision. In view of the appellate court's uncertainty as to whether the negligence
counts were dismissed on economic loss, lack of duty, or lack of privity grounds, it can fairly be
assumed that the trial record is not complete. See 95 Ill. App. 3d at 446, 420 N.E.2d at 210.
72. 95 Ill. App. 3d 444, 420 N.E.2d 209 (4th Dist. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 92 I11. 2d
171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
73. Dismissal of the third-party beneficiary count was held to have been proper because
Redarowicz was not a direct beneficiary of the contract to repair between the builder and the city,
95 Ill. App. 3d at 447, 420 N.E.2d at 211. In Justice Webber's view, the purpose of this contract
was to compel code compliance for the benefit of the public, not Redarowicz. The court cited for
support Porter v. City of Urbana, 88 Ill. App. 3d 443,410 N.E.2d 610 (4th Dist. 1980)(municipality
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The dismissal of the two negligence counts was held to have been
proper because no duty was owed by the defendant builder to third
persons, such as a subsequent purchaser. 74 The court agreed with
Redarowicz that privity was no longer required for recovery in tort, but
disagreed that the consequence of this was a duty owing to subsequent
purchasers. Arguments going to whether the plaintiff was alleging a
solely economic loss, and whether recovery for this loss was permissible, were unneeded and inappropriate if no duty was owed to the plaintiff. Furthermore, in the court's view a home was not a "product"
within the contemplated protection of the economic loss doctrine.
Thus the plaintiff's reliance on the Fourth District's narrowing of this
doctrine in Moorman75 to allow recovery in tort for solely economic

loss in products liability cases was inapposite. 76

Dismissal of the implied warranty of habitability count was held
77
to have been proper because Redarowicz was a subsequent purchaser.
The court had considered and denied extending the implied warranty
to subsequent purchasers in Mellander v. Kileen, 7 8 and saw no need to
re-examine its position.
Only the dismissal of the contract count based on Redarowicz'
agreement not to sue, in exchange for the builder's promise to repair,
is not liable in tort to crime victim, because duty to maintain community well-being is owed to
general public, not to specific members). Dismissal of the fraud count was held to have been
proper because the builder's promises to repair were not misrepresentations of a past or existing
fact, and because Redarowicz had no right to rely to his detriment on these promises, 95 iln. App.
3d at 448, 420 N.E.2d at 211, citing Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 11. App. 3d 961, 328 N.E.2d
350 (1st Dist. 1974). Justice Webber found Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320,
371 N.E.2d 634 (1977) distinguishable in that Steinberg, where a fraud action against a private
medical school was allowed for a promise to take a future action, ie. to evaluate applicants according to published criteria, involved a scheme orplot to defraud the plaintiff of his application
fees. 95 II. App. 3d at 447, 420 N.E.2d at 211.
74. 95 Ill. App. 3d at 446-47, 420 N.E.2d at 210-11, citing Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384
N.E.2d 368 (1978).
75. Leave to appeal the Fourth District's Moorman decision had been allowed by the Illinois
Supreme Court at the time of the Fourth District's Redarowicz decision. See 84 Ill. 2d 19 (1981).
But Moorman had not yet been reversed by the supreme court, 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443
(1982).
76. Discussion of the economic loss doctrine was necessitated by the fact that the Fourth
District decision in Moorman had abolished the economic loss bar to recovery in negligence for
that district. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
77. 95 I11.App. 3d at 447, 420 N.E.2d at 211.
78. 86 I11.App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist. 1980). The Mellander decision rejected
public policy arguments in favor of expanding the Petersen implied warranty of habitability to
subsequent purchasers. The court noted in Mellander that the implied warranty sounded in contract rather than in tort, and thus required privity. Extensions of the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers in other jurisdictions, such as the Indiana Supreme Court's
decision in Barnes v. MacBrown and Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976), were an unwarranted extension of tort concepts into a contracts area.
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was found by the appellate court to have been improper. 79 Illinois case
law established that a promise to refrain from legal action was valuable
consideration, and an agreement based on such consideration was thus
enforceable. 80 The court determined that the case should be remanded
for further proceedings on this count.
Justice Craven's dissent 8 ' took issue with the majority's dismissal
of Redarowicz' negligence counts and focused on the roles of privity,
the economic loss doctrine, and the accepted work doctrine in tort
law.8 2 Justice Craven pointed out that since Suvada v. White Motor
Co. ,83 as clarified by Rozny v. Marnul,84 privity was not an element of
products liability negligence actions in Illinois. Thus Redarowicz' negligence counts could not be barred by his lack of privity with the
builder. 85 Furthermore, the court's own decision in Moorman now allowed the purchaser of a defective grain storage tank to recover in tort
for its solely economic loss. 86 The difference between a grain storage
tank and a home should not compel a different result. Justice Craven
noted in his dissent that other states now allowed home buyers to recover against the builder for solely economic loss, citing decisions from
South Dakota, Wyoming, and California. 87 Finally, the defendant
builder was arguing that the accepted work doctrine 88 barred recovery
in tort, but Illinois Supreme Court decisions now circumscribed this
doctrine so as to allow recovery against an independent contractor who
89
knew of concealed defects.
79. 95 Ill. App. 3d at 448, 420 N.E.2d at 213.
80. Id., citing White v. Walker, 31 Ill. 422 (1863)(waiving a right to sue on a breach of the
implied warranty of quiet enjoyment was consideration supporting a modification lowering the
rent on a lease contract); United Factors Div. of United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Murphy, 345
F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 197 1)(lender's forbearance from suing on debt owed was consideration for
stockholder's giving of a subordination agreement).
81. 95 IUl. App. 3d at 449, 420 N.E.2d at 213 (Craven, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
82. Justice Craven did not directly address the issue of a builder's duty to subsequent purchasers, which formed the basis of the majority's dismissal of the counts in negligence. See supra
text accompanying notes 74-76.
83. 32 I11.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
84. 43 III. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
85. The majority agreed with Justice Craven on this point. 95 I11.App. 3d at 448, 420 N.E.2d
at 211.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
87. Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600
P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963).
88. See supra note 10. The majority opinion did not discuss the accepted work doctrine.
Presumedly, Justice Craven's discussion was based on his perception that it was this doctrine
which was preventing the majority from finding a duty owed. See supra text accompanying note
74.
89. 95 111. App. 3d at 450, 420 N.E.2d at 213, citing Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill.
2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1956); Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978). In Harrir
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The Craven dissent also took issue with the majority's dismissal of
the implied warranty of habitability count. In the dissent's view, the
result in Mellander, barring a subsequent purchaser's recovery on an
implied warranty of habitability, had been incorrect. The better approach would recognize the implied warranty as a mixture of tort and
contract principles born out of the need to protect home purchasers
generally, and remove unjustifiable obstacles in the way of placing liability for construction defects on the builder. The purposes of the implied warranty of habitability were frustrated by the retention of privity
requirements.9 0
Redarowicz petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to ap-

peal, which was granted.
The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
Justice Clark delivered the 5-2 majority opinion of the court. 91
The court upheld the appellate court's dismissal of the negligence and
fraud counts, but reversed the dismissal of the third-party beneficiary
92
and implied warranty of habitability counts.
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's dismissal
of the two negligence counts, but not because Redarowicz was outside
the scope of the builder's duty to others as the appellate court had
found.93 The question of the scope of the builder's duty did not need to
be addressed. Rather, the court returned to the economic loss arguFurniture the Illinois Supreme Court recognized exceptions to the accepted work doctrine which
would allow a negligence action by a property owner against a heating contractor where the work
involved dangerous materials or procedures, or where the independent contractor knew of concealed defects.
90. 95 Ill. App. 3d at 452-53, 420 N.E.2d at 214-15. See also The Fall of the Citadel, supra
note 11, at 800-02.
91. 92 IlL. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982). The dissenting opinion was by Chief Justice Ryan,
and was joined by Justice Underwood.
92. As the appellate court had done, the supreme court discussed all of the plaintifi's counts.
The fraud and third-party beneficiary counts, see supra note 73 required only brief explanation.
The dismissal of the fraud count was upheld, but for reasons other than given by the appellate
court. The supreme court, citing both Illinois case law and 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 3 (1943), found that
Redarowicz had failed in his pleadings to allege an intent on the defendant builder's part to induce the plaintiff to act. Thus the fraud count was missing an element in the pleadings essential to
state a cause of action. 92 Ill. 2d at 186, 441 N.E.2d at 331 (1982). Dismissal of the count pleading
recovery as a third-party beneficiary was reversed based on the supreme court's arrival at the
opposite conclusion when it examined Redarowicz' status as a direct and intended beneficiary.
Both courts had examined the nature of contracts between a builder and the city where the builder
promises to repair code violations in return for the city's promise to forego prosecution. The
appellate court had found in this situation that the home owner was not a direct and intended
beneficiary. See supra note 73. The supreme court found however that he was. 92 Ill. 2d at 179,
441 N.E.2d at 328 (1982)(citing from both Illinois case law and treatises).
93. 92 Ill. 2d at 176-77, 441 N.E.2d at 326-27 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 74.
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ment that had been dismissed by the majority in the appellate court.
Redarowicz' complaint alleged qualitative defects in the home's construction constituting solely economic loss. 94 The court's recent rever-

sal of the appellate court's Moorman decision in the interim between
the Redarowicz decision in the Fourth District and its consideration
before the Illinois Supreme Court removed any doubt that recovery in
tort was barred in Illinois courts for solely economic losses.9 5 The
Moorman action had been brought by the purchaser of a defective
grain storage tank whereas the Redarowicz action was being brought by
the purchaser of a defective home, but the court found "no sound reason to treat either of the aforementioned purchasers differently from
96
one another."
In the majority's view, disappointment, frustrated expectations,
and diminished value when a product proved to be of inferior quality
97
were not the sort of harms that tort law was intended to redress.
Rather, actions in negligence required a showing of physical damage
through either personal injury or damage to other property. Plaintiff
Redarowicz was not complaining of physical injuries or damage to personal property caused by a collapsing structure. He was complaining
that he had received a structure that was less than he had bargained
for.98
94. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
95. The Moorman decision in the Fourth District had created a split in the Illinois appellate
courts on the question of recovery in negligence for solely economic losses. The Fourth District
had allowed these losses in Moorman, while the First and Second Districts had denied them in
Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1st Dist. 1980) and
Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 951, 435 N.E.2d 210
(2d Dist. 1982).
96. 92 Ill. 2d at 177, 441 N.E.2d at 327. Accord 95 Ill. App. 3d at 449, 420 N.E.2d at 213
(Craven, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Craven, arguing in his appellate level
dissent that the fourth district's Moorman rejection of the economic loss doctrine permitted
Redarowicz' tort counts, had found no sound reason to treat the products (ie. storage tank and
home) differently from one another. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
97. 92 Ill. 2d at 176-78, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (1982), citing Economic Loss supra note 40; Comment, Manufacturers'Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966). (hereinafter referred to as Manufacturers'Liability). The
court also quoted the Missouri Supreme Court's distinction between the safety-related damages
traditionally protected in tort and the quality-related damages traditionally protected in contract
in Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978). In Crowder, the Missouri Supreme
Court recognized the existence of an implied warranty of habitability in sales of new homes to the
initial purchasers, but rejected claims based on negligence and an implied warranty of habitability
in an action brought against the builder by a subsequent purchaser.
98. 92 Ill. 2d at 178, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (1982). By incorporating a collapsing structure into
his hypothetical example Justice Clark confounded the issue, as in this situation two different
means of avoiding the economic loss doctrine are arguable. Justice Clark may have been focusing
on the injury or additional property damage as the reason for allowing recovery in tort, or he may
have been focusing on the accidental self-destruction of the product, in this case the home. Accidental self-destruction of the product has been the basis for allowing recovery in tort regardless of
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The majority's reversal of the appellate court on Redarowicz' plea
for recovery on an implied warranty of habitability entailed an historical analysis of the growth of this protection and a review of the rationales behind, and the purposes served by, the implied warranty. The
court noted the modem trend toward an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes, citing cases in 23 states other than Illinois. 99 Within Illinois, the implied warranty of habitability was first
recognized in a landlord-tenant context in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,' °°
but had now been extended to the sale of new homes in Weck v. A.M
Sunrise Construction Co. 101 and Park v. Sohn' 0 2 as well as Petersen.
Justice Clark stated that the purpose of the implied warranty of
habitability was protection from latent construction defects for the
home buyer, who typically lacked both the opportunity and the knowledge to inspect the builder's methods, and was thus forced to rely to a
substantial degree on the builder's integrity and expertise. 0 3 In the sale
of a new home, the builder-vendor and the purchaser did not stand on
equal footing, and the implied warranty of habitability was a "judicial
innovation" designed to protect the innocent purchaser in this situation.'°4 The subsequent purchaser was equally deserving and needful
of this protection. The subsequent purchaser was typically no more
knowledgeable than the initial purchaser as to housing construction,
and thus relied to the same degree on the builder's integrity and skill.
Justice Clark reasoned that repair costs incurred by the purchaser
as a result of defective construction should be borne by the builder who
was responsible for those defects. 0 5 The mobility of modem society
created a situation where the builder could expect some homes to be
physical injury or damage to additional property, and has come to be known as the 'property
damage' exception to the economic loss doctrine. See Note, Products Liability. Expanding the
Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1978).
Cases applying this exception are compiled at 16 A.L.R. 3d 683 (1967). In Santor, the New Jersey
Supreme Court suggested that additional property damage would remove the economic loss doctrine's bar to recovery in tort. See supra text accompanying note 44. But the Santor court did not
discuss accidental self-destruction. In Seely, the California Supreme Court suggested that only
personal injury would remove the doctrine's bar to recovery. See supra text accompanying notes
45-47.
99. 92 II. 2d at 180-81, 441 N.E.2d at 328-29 (1982). The states recognizing the implied
warranty of habitability for new homes, and the cases in which this recognition was made in each
state, are listed at Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability, New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL ESTATE L. J. 291, 303-06 (1980). Shedd lists 37 states plus the District of Columbia
recognizing the implied warranty as of 1980.
100. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
101. 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (Ist Dist. 1962).
2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982).
102. 89 Ill.
103. 92 II. 2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 330 (1982), citing Petersen and Park.
104. 92 Ill. 2d at 183, 441 N.E.2d at 330 (1982).
105. Id.
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resold within a short period of time, before latent defects had become
apparent. In these situations it was unfair that the builder could escape
the liability that would otherwise attach because of a privity requirement limiting the life of the implied warranty to the time that the home
was held by the initial buyer. 106 A privity requirement placed an illogical, arbitrary limit on the implied warranty which frustrated the purposes for which it was created. The better approach would be to limit
the implied warranty of habitability 0to7 a reasonable time period without regard to a privity requirement.'
The court observed that this extension of the implied warranty to
protect subsequent purchasers had already been made by the supreme
courts of Indiana, in Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co. ;108 Wyoming, in
Moxley v. Laramie Builders Inc. ;1o9 South Carolina, in Terlinde v.
Neely; 10 and Oklahoma, in Elden v. Simmons. I I Finally it noted that
this extension of the implied warranty was consistent with Section 2312 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 1 2 which provides for thirdparty beneficiaries and assignment of warranty.
Chief Justice Ryan's Dissent' 13
Chief Justice Ryan did not disagree with the result itself, i.e. the
ability to recover against the builder for repair costs or diminution of
value even though the plaintiff was not in privity with the builder, and
the fact that the plaintiff incurred solely an economic loss. Rather, the
106. The court quoted the Supreme Court of Wyoming's decision in Moxley v. Laramie
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979)("any reasoning which would arbitrarily interpose a first
buyer as an obstruction to someone equally as deserving of recovery is incomprehensible"). Id. at
736.
107. 92 Ill. 2d at 185, 441 N.E.2d at 331 (1982).
108. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
109. 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
110. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
Ill. 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981). Other courts which had extended the implied warranty of
habitability to subsequent purchasers were the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Blagg v. Fred Hunt
Co., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981); and the Superior Court of New Jersey, in Hermes v. Staiano, 181
N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981). However, during the same six-year period after the Indiana
Supreme Court's Barnes decision, courts in six states expressly rejected this extension. See Drexel
Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So.2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.
1978); Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978); Coburn v.
Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977); Herz v. Thornwood Acres 'D' Inc., 86
Misc.2d 53, 381 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Justice Ct. 1976), aft'd, 91 Misc.2d 130, 397 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1977).
112.

13 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 615 (1980). THE UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 2-312 (b)

states as follows:
Notwithstanding any agreement that only the immediate buyer has the benefit or warranties of quality with respect to the real estate, or that warranties received from a prior
seller do not pass to the buyer, a conveyance of real estate transfers to the buyer all
warranties of quality made by prior sellers.
113. 92 I11. 2d at 186, 441 N.E.2d at 331 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice disagreed with the means by which the majority achieved
its result.
The Chief Justice briefly reviewed the development of strict liability in tort for products liability from its origin as a contract action
based on an implied warranty, and thus requiring privity; 14 through
an intermediate stage as an action based on an implied warranty but
with the privity requirement dropped;"15 to its present status as a tort
action with no privity requirement."16 In his view, by removing the
privity requirement from an action based on an implied warranty of
habitability, the majority was now retracing the same steps, i.e., transforming an action on an implied warranty from a contract action into
strict liability in tort.'1 7 Furthermore, by utilizing the fiction of an implied warranty without privity, the majority was doing so in a way
which thus allowed "strict liability in tort" recovery for solely economic
loss in spite of the court's earlier ruling to the contrary only months
before in Moorman. 8 If the intent of the majority was to retreat from
the court's decision in Moorman and allow recovery for solely economic loss under a strict liability in tort theory, Chief Justice Ryan
would prefer that the court do so straight-forwardly rather than by returning to the fiction of the implied warranty without privity." 9
ANALYSIS

In Redarowicz, the Illinois Supreme Court perceived the subsequent purchaser of a defectively constructed home as inadequately protected under the law as it existed previously. This perception is widely
shared and is undoubtedly correct. The Redarowicz decision makes
Illinois the ninth state in the last six years to recognize a subsequent
purchaser's cause of action against the builder for latent defects in
home construction. The courts have based their decisions either on tort
theories, 20 an implied warranty of habitability,12' or both. 122 In this
114.
115.
116.
Cal. 2d
N.E.2d
117.

Id. at 187, 441 N.E.2d at 332.
Id., citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
92 Ill. 2d at 187-88, 441 N.E.2d at 332, citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
182 (1965).
92 111. 2d at 187, 441 N.E.2d at 332.

118. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
119. 92 Ill. 2d at 187, 441 N.E.2d at 332.
120. See Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So.2d 515 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)(negligence); Morris v. Holt, 380 Mass. 131, 401 N.E.2d 851 (1980)(negligence); Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977)(negligence).
121. See Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Moxley v. Laramie
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. MacBrown and Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d
619 (1976).
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same time period, only Missouri has refused to recognize any cause of
action for the subsequent purchaser against the builder over latent construction defects which cause solely economic loss. 1 23 However, in its
decision to allow recovery for such losses under an implied warranty of
habitability theory but not under tort theories, the Illinois Supreme
Court has created a number of thorny problems.
Extension of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
to Subsequent Purchasers
The Redarowicz extension of the implied warranty of habitability
protects the subsequent purchaser's economic expectation by allowing
the subsequent purchaser to place liability for the economic loss of latent construction defects on the builder, rather than on the subsequent
purchaser's party in privity, i.e., the previous purchaser. The rationale
given for this extension is that it is the builder who is the party "at
fault" for the latent defects, it is the builder who would be liable for the
defects but for the fortuity of the subsequent sale, and it is thus right24
fully the builder who should pay the subsequent purchaser for them. 1
Initial purchasers are now protected in a majority of states, including
Illinois, by an implied warranty of habitability. As the courts have
generally pointed out, the subsequent purchaser is typically no more
knowledgeable than the initial purchaser as to the construction design,
methods, and materials which may or may not lead to future
problems. 25 Furthermore, the subsequent purchaser lacks whatever
small protection the initial purchaser may gain from the opportunity to
inspect and oversee the actual construction. 26 Thus, the subsequent
purchaser's economic expectation would seem to be at least as deserving as the initial purchaser's, and extending the implied warranty of
habitability is one means of protecting that economic expectation.
Protection of the subsequent purchaser's economic expectation is,
however, not the court's only concern. The builder as well can justifiably expect legal protection from extensions of the implied warranty
122. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981)(strict liability and implied warranty of habitability); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (198 l)(strict liability,
negligence, and implied warranty of habitability); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768
(19 8 0 )(negligence and implied warranty of habitability).
123. See Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
125. Id. See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. Mac
Brown and Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
126. The recently depressed housing market has undoubtedly left numerous new homes in
Illinois completed with no purchaser. Thus at this time even a large percentage of initial purchasers in Illinois may buy a home that they have not seen in its construction phases.
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which would open up unforseeable, potentially crippling long-term liability for construction flaws. 127 Avoiding unforeseeable liability to subsequent purchasers was one of the justifications given by the Illinois
Supreme Court for rejecting the economic loss doctrine in Moorman,128
and Illinois courts have continued to recognize that implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness do not extend vertically down the privity
"chain" to subsequent purchasers unless the breach of the implied warranty has caused personal injury to the plaintiff so as to invoke the
privity exception created by the Illinois Supreme Court in Berry v. G.
D. Searle & Co. 129 The courts appear to agree that it would be unfair
to require that the manufacturer of grain storage tanks insure against
the frustrated economic expectations of subsequent purchasers. If there
is truly no reason to treat the sale of a home and a grain storage tank
differently, as Justice Clark of the supreme court and Justice Craven of
the appellate court believed, then it would seem equally unfair to require that the manufacturer of homes be required to so insure by extending the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers.
Hopefully, extending the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers will in practice result in a manageable additional liability. The various potential latent defects in the construction can be expected to
become apparent within a period of time that, based on the builder's
knowledge and experience in the trade, may be somewhat predictable.
The conscientious builder can build, plan, and insure with this liability
in mind. 30 Furthermore, recent studies conducted by the Census Bu127. See Bearman, supra note 1, wherein Bearmen discusses implied warranty protections
from the builder's perspective. Builders can at times justifiably complain that the difficulty of
establishing the cause of problems in a home results in the builder being held responsible for the
combination of normal wear-and-tear and unrealistic expectations.
128. 91 Ill. 2d at 79, 435 N.E.2d at 447. See supra note 62.
129. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 551 (1974). In Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., the plaintiff, who
was not in privity with the defendant manufacturer, was allowed by the Illinois Supreme Court to
plead on an implied warranty theory against the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive that allegedly caused the plaintiff to suffer a stroke. The Berry exception to the general requirement of
privity thus created has been consistently interpreted by the Illinois courts to require personal
injury on the part of the plaintiff, caused by the defendant's breach of the implied warranty. See,
e.g., Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1st Dist. 1978)(stroke
allegedly caused by contraceptive). Compare Knox v. North American Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d
683, 399 N.E.2d 1355 (Ist Dist. 1980)(worker injured by defendant's boxcar was not in the vertical
chain of privity with the defendant and thus could not rely on the Berry exception); Mellander v.
Kileen, 86 Ill. App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist. 1980)(subsequent purchaser of home had
sustained no physical injuries and thus could not rely on the Berry exception). See generally,

Comment, Knox v. North American Car Corp.: Re-Examination of Privity of Contract in UCC
Implied WarrantyActions, II Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 637 (1980), wherein the author recommends abolishing the privity requirement to recovery on implied warranties.
130. Insurance against defective construction claims has been available to builders since 1974
when a program developed by the National Association of Home Builders, and administered by
the Home Owners Warranty Corporation, came into effect. Builder enrollment in this program or
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reau for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 13' and
by the Mathematica Policy Research for the Federal Trade Commission, 132 have suggested that the most common defects in residential
construction are neither particularly common nor particularly severe.' 33 The additional insurance cost incurred by the builder through
the Redarowicz extension of the implied warranty of habitability to
subsequent purchasers would appear to be minimal. However, this is
undoubtedly true in other commercial contexts as well, and does not
answer the question of why sellers of homes should be subjected to a
greater liability than sellers of grain storage tanks.
The more serious problem with the Redarowicz extension of the
implied warranty of habitability is the effect that it will have, in theory,
on the builder's present ability to bargain with the initial purchaser on
modifications and disclaimers of warranties. The Petersen court recognized the builder's ability to bargain for a knowing disclaimer of an
implied warranty of habitability, 34 and provisions in the law of sales
for warranty modifications and disclaimers was an important aspect of
the Moorman court's adoption of the economic loss doctrine. 3 5 The
Illinois Commercial Code expressly provides for the allocation and division of risks in Section 2-303 and the various sections covering express and implied warranties. 36 If the law of sales is the more
any other similar program has been made mandatory by statute in New Jersey, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§43:3B(l)-(12)(West Supp. 1983); and in Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 327A(.01)(.07)(West Supp. 1983). See generally, Weicher, ProductQuality and Value in the New Home Market."
Implicationsfor Consumer Protection Regulation, 24 J. L. & ECON. 365 (1981)(hereinafter
cited as Weicher).
131. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS
FOR SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS (series H-170, 1974-1976).
132.

KALUZNY, A SURVEY OF HOMEOWNER EXPERIENCE WITH NEW RESIDENTIAL HOUSING

CONSTRUCTION (Mathematica Policy Research 1980).

133. See Weicher, supra note 130, at 369-74. Weicher compiled the results of three home
construction defects surveys, including the surveys conducted for HUD and the FTC, see supra
notes 131 and 132, and determined that the two most common defects in new residential construction were fuses which tended to blow (12% of all new homes surveyed) and dampness in the
basement (18% of all new homes with a basement surveyed).
134. "Although the implied warranty of habitability is a creature of public policy, we do not
consider a knowing disclaimer of the implied warranty to be against the public policy of this
state." Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159. But see Crowder
v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d at 881 (Mo. 1978), where the Missouri Supreme Court stated that
"boilerplate" disclaimers of implied warranties would not be recognized.
135. See supra text accompanying note 58.
136. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 26 § 2-203 (1977). "§ 2-303. Allocation or division of risks. Where
this Article allocates a risk or a burden as between the parties '(unless otherwise agreed)', the
agreement may not only shift the allocation but may also divide the risk or burden." See also Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 26 § 2-316 (1977). Exclusion or modification of warranties allowing for the exclusion or modification of implied warranties in subsections (3)(a) - (3)(d); § 2-317. Cumulation and
conflict of warranties express or implied ("Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable
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appropriate law for the resolution of disputes concerning defectively
constructed homes, these provisions would appear to be available to the

parties.
Yet the Redarowicz court gives no indication of what effect such
bargaining will have on the subsequent purchaser's implied warranty,
and the commercial code provides no guidance for whether an initial

purchaser can bargain away the implied warranty protections of the
subsequent purchaser. Thus, the builder is left to bargain with the initial purchaser over warranty modifications which later may be nonbinding on the subsequent purchaser, and the initial purchaser is left to
bargain on warranties which may accrue only to the benefit of the subsequent purchaser, with little way of predicting what those warranties
37
may be worth to the subsequent purchaser. 1
Prior to the Redarowicz decision, the builder was given a mecha-

nism by which to escape liability for latent construction defects at random among the homes the builder had constructed. The actuarily
astute builder could rely on the mobility of new home buyers, coupled
with the privity requirement, to avoid liability for construction defects
in that percentage of homes that were resold before flaws appeared.
The loser in the builder's gamble was of course the subsequent purchaser. With the privity requirement removed by the Redarowicz decision, the builder can now expect potential liability for construction
flaws to continue for a period of time controlled only by the nature of
the flaws themselves and the statute of limitations, 1 38 and the subsethe intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant ...
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.")
137. The problem that extending the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers creates for initial bargaining over warranties has been recognized by a number of courts in
their rejection of this extension. See Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979); Duncan v.
Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564
S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978); Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977). Illinois courts have been suspicious of such bargaining in cases since Petersen, and have ruled unanimously against modification and disclaimer contract clauses in post-Petersen implied warranty
cases. See Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 58-59, 421 N.E.2d 1073, 1076-77 (2d Dist.
1981); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 I11. App. 3d 581, 592, 410 N.E.2d 902, 909 (1st Dist. 1980);
Park v. Sohn, 90 111. App. 3d 794, 798, 414 N.E.2d 1, 5 (3d Dist. 1980) aff'd in part, rev'dinpart,89
Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982); Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316-17,
415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1st Dist. 1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
138. Problems can of course be created because common construction defects do not appear
within a narrow range of time. This was recognized by the court in Wagner Constr. Co., v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. 1980), where septic tank problems did not appear until the home was
five years old and had already been resold by the initial purchaser. Justice Craven in his
Redarowicz concurrence suggested that "a builder should be liable until expiration of the applicable statute of limitations for the cost of repairing a house that is falling apart." 95 I!1. App. 3d at
452, 420 N.E.2d at 214. In Illinois that would now be approximately twelve years. See infra note
155.
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quent purchaser can buy knowing that if defects appear the court has
provided some degree of protection. The protection for the subsequent
purchaser was needed and is welcomed, but the Redarowicz court has
apparently provided it by making the builder an insurer. It is this very
"insurance" aspect which suggests that tort law may in fact be the more
appropriate law to deal with the situation.
The Economic Loss Limitation
The Illinois Supreme Court's economic loss limitation to recovery
in negligence for defectively built homes is an extension of a troublesome doctrine into an area for which it is poorly suited and unneeded.
The economic loss doctrine is an attempt to reliably direct legal disputes into the area of the law best suited to deal with plaintiffs' particular losses, and best able to provide defendants with appropriate
protection, while allocating the risk of loss equitably between the
two. 1 39 However, the doctrine has been the source of more dispute
than guidance since the New Jersey and California supreme courts
4
came to opposite conclusions on the doctrine in Santor and Seely.' 0
Courts in the Santor camp point to the apparent illogic of identical
plaintiffs with different recoveries,' 4 ' while courts in the Seely camp
point to the apparent unfairness of recovery in tort for an essentially
commercial transaction. 42 The Redarowicz decision merely cites to
Moorman and adds nothing to this debate.
Justice Simon, in his Moorman concurring opinion, took a long
step toward resolving the controversy over the economic loss doctrine. 43 Justice Simon pointed out that the economic loss versus physical harm distinction was being used as a proxy for the more difficult
determination of whether, when all aspects of the case were considered,
the "insurance policy" aspect of tort law's protection from harm or the
"bargain protection" aspect of contract law's protection of economic
interests provided the better approach. 144 The Redarowicz court looked
139. See Economic Loss supra note 40; Manufacturers' supra note 97.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
141. See supra text accompanying note 44.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
143. 91 Ill. 2d at 87, 435 N.E.2d at 455 (Simon, J., concurring).
144. Both Justice Simon and the Moorman majority in the appellate court referred approvingly to the approach taken by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), where the court analyzed the problem this way:
[Tihe items for which damages are sought, such as repair costs, are not determinative.
Rather, the line between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing interrelatedfactors
such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose.
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to the Moorman decision as its source for the economic loss doctrine,
but did not consider Justice Simon's suggestion that factors other than
simply plaintiff's damage be considered in determining whether the
economic loss doctrine should be applied to channel the dispute into
contract law. When factors such as the nature of the product, the relationship between the parties, and fault notions are considered, contract
law may not clearly be the more appropriate law for dealing with disputes over defects in home construction.
It has been generally recognized that a home is an extraordinary
"product" in the range of products purchased by consumers. 4 5 It is
likely to be far more expensive than the consumer purchases that form
the bulk of the consumer transactions governed by the commercial
code.146 The risk of loss due to a serious structural defect may be
slight, 147 but the result could be financially devastating to the typical
home buyer. Thus, the home buyer is in a poor position to engage in
the kind of bargaining over the allocation of risk that the commercial
code envisions in its warranty provisions. Faced with this risk, the
home buyer may be in more need of tort law's wider scope of protection against unreasonable harm, i.e., its "insurance" aspects, than of
contract law's narrower protection of the parties' economic interests.
Furthermore, the home buyer is not in an analogous position with
Moorman's storage tank purchaser. The typical home buyer is not
buying a home for commercial use, either as a place of business or as a
rental property. The home buyer may have "commercial" expectations, i.e., that the home will appreciate in value and that it will create
favorable tax consequences, but the intent of the buyer would seem to
be more the provision of shelter than the realization of an economic
benefit. A defectively constructed home is not simply a frustration of
the buyer's economic expectations, it is inadequate shelter.
The sale of a home is not the "arm's length" commercial transaction that the commercial code envisions. The home buyer is typically
These factors bear directly on whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the
expectation-bargain protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a particular
claim.
Id. at 1173 (emphasis added).
145. The determination of whether a home is a "product" will often be accomplished by first
deciding whether products liability principles are appropriate, and then on that basis "pronounce"
the home one way or the other. See, e.g., Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Ark.
1981).
146. Recently released figures from the National Association of Homebuilders placed the median price of a new home in June of 1982 at $72,600. Marth, A Housing Era Ends, NATION'S
BuSINEss 26, 27 (Sept. 1982).
147. See Weicher, supra note 130 at 369-74.
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presented with warranty terms from the builder on a standardized
building contract, and despite the comprehensive provisions available
to the parties under the commercial code, no bargaining on warranty
provisions takes place at all. 148 Recognizing the relative bargaining
positions of the parties, Illinois courts have been extremely suspicious
of warranty modification or disclaimer clauses in contracts for the sale
of a home and have required not only that the clause be "a conspicuous
provision fully disclosing the consequences of its inclusion," but have
further required the builder to independently prove that the parties in
fact bargained to an agreement on the clause. 14 9 The courts would appear to be recognizing that the sale of a new home is not a typical
commercial transaction where traditional contract interpretation guidelines can be applied.
Lastly, recent decisions extending a cause of action against the
builder to subsequent purchasers have been generally based on the rationale that the builder has been "at fault" in the building of the defective home, and is the responsible party to make reparations to the
subsequent purchaser. 50 Such reasoning strongly suggests an unspoken initial premise that builders owe a duty of care to future home
owners generally to build non-negligently. In the Indiana courts where
implied warranty actions brought by subsequent purchasers have been
allowed since the Indiana Supreme Court's seminal 1976 decision in
Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co. ,151 the prima facie case for implied warranty has developed as "warranty," "breach of warranty," "causation,"
1 52
and "damages," with clear tort overtones.
The results of incorporating the economic loss doctrine into the
law of real property in Illinois may be wide-ranging. The occasional
buyer who has had the good fortune of totally avoiding physical injury
or additional property damages as a result of a latent construction defect, or who neglects to allege such damage in the complaint, loses the
option of pleading in negligence when the facts of the case, such as an
extended period of time before the defect was discovered, ' 3 or an ar148. See, e.g., Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 I11. App. 3d 53, 58-59, 421 N.E.2d 1073, 1076-77
(2d Dist. 1981); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 IU. App. 3d 581, 592, 410 N.E.2d 902, 909 (1st Dist.
1980); Park v. Sohn, 90 Inl. App. 3d 794, 798, 414 N.E.2d 1, 5 (3d Dist. 1980), afl'd in part, rev'din
part, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982); Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 I11. App. 3d 310,
316-17, 415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1st Dist. 1980).
149. Herlihy 92 I11. App. 3d at 316-17, 415 N.E.2d at 1228-29.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
151. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976). See supra notes 108, 121, and 125.
152. See, e.g., Pelz Constr. Co. v. Dunham, 436 N.E.2d 892 (Ct. App. Ind. 1982).
153. Due to the "discovery rule" for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run.
See infra note 155.
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guably unforeseeable economic loss, 154 may have made that a preferable theory of recovery.1 55 The builder as well has lost the option of
arguing that tort defenses such as comparative negligence may be applicable to the case. Furthermore, the unqualified language of the
Redarowicz court raises serious questions concerning the decision's effect on other areas of the law of real property with tort aspects. The
Redarowicz court does not discuss the effect that the decision will have
on actions pleading fraud or malpractice where the home buyer has
incurred exclusively economic loss. 156 The Redarowicz court says simply that "it is now clear.

. .

that a plaintiff cannot recover solely eco-

tort."' 157

It is difficult to forecast the effect of such
nomic losses in
language in tort areas that are already confused with contract
58
principles.
Lastly, the Redarowicz decision raises serious questions concerning
the ability of the non-resident investment purchaser' 59 to recover
against the builder for solely economic loss. These are purchasers with
clear economic expectations, yet typically they have been denied pro154. Unforeseeable damages are generally not recoverable in contract actions. See supra note
52.
155. Until recently, the Illinois statute of limitations made pleading in negligence significantly
more desirable for the plaintiff who became aware of a construction defect after the home was five
years old. Actions on an implied warranty of habitability were limited by the five-year statute
applicable to oral contracts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 13-205 (1982). See, e.g., Altevogt v.
Brinkoetter, 85 I11.
2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981). The limitation period began running when the
home was completed and the deed was passed. Id. The limitation period for actions in negligence, however, which also were limited by § 13-205, began running when the plaintiff discovered
or reasonably should have discovered the defect. Thus a defect which laid dormant for four years
after completion and sale of the home might leave only one year inwhich to bring an action on an
implied warranty, but five years in negligence. The Illinois legislature solved this discrepancy in
June of 1982 by incorporating a new twelve year statute of limitations applying to all actions
whether in contract or tort pertaining to all types of construction. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 13214 (1982). Furthermore, the limitation of this new section to homes built after November 29,
1979, § 13-214(e), which was in the statute as originally passed has now been repealed by the 1982
Revisory Act, Senate Bill 1247, effective July 13, 1982. The new twelve-year statute of limitations
for construction defects in Illinois may remove what has been viewed in the past as the builder's
most effective way of evading the expanding implied warranty of habitability protections, i.e., the
fact that latent defects often would not become apparent within the statutory time period. See
generally Note, Implied Warranties of Habitability--RecentDevelopments, 29 DEFENSE L. J. 505
(1980).
156. Fraud in particular has been a much-used alternative theory of recovery for home buyers.
Cases in Illinois where fraud counts were included with implied or express warranty of habitability counts include Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 794, 414 N.E.2d I (3d Dist. 1980), ar'd in part,
2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982), Kramp v. Showcase Builders, 97 Ill. App. 3d
rev'din part, 89 Ill.
17, 422 N.E.2d 958 (2d Dist. 1981), Himmelstein v. Valenti Dev. Corp., 103 Ill. App. 3d 911, 431
N.E.2d 1299 (1st Dist. 1982), and Waterford Condominium Ass'n v. Dunbar Corp., 104 Ill. App.
3d 371, 432 N.E.2d 1009 (1st Dist. 1982).
157. 92 Ill. 2d at 176, 441 N.E.2d at 326 (1982).
158. See Manufacturer'sLiability supra note 97.
159. The private investor who purchases a single-family or duplex dwelling as rental property
for either income or investment purposes.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

* tection in the past under the implied warranty of habitability on the
grounds that they were "commercial purchasers" rather than "consumers."' 6 The Redarowicz decision now denies them protection under
tort theories as well, by virtue of the fact that they do not live on the
premises and thus are less likely to sustain the physical injuries or damage to personal property required by the Redarowicz court for recovery
in tort. Thus the Redarowicz decision leaves these purchasers with severe limitations on their options for recovery against the builder for
latent structural defects, and raises- serious questions about the advisability of investment purchases for buyers who are not in a position
either to knowledgeably assess the risks of defective construction, insure against the risks of defective construction, or bargain effectively
for express warranties.
CONCLUSION

By extending the implied warranty of habitability to the subsequent purchaser, the Redarowicz decision corrects a deficiency in Illinois' legal protections for the subsequent purchaser, hopefully without
creating a substantially increased builder liability in the beleaguered
home construction market. The combined effect of this decision, Petersen and its progeny, and the new Illinois statute of limitations for construction-related actions will undoubtedly be an implied warranty of
habitability in Illinois which satisfies the need of the subsequent purchaser for some degree of legal protection from defective home construction. However, it is not clear what effect this extension will have
on warranties generally in the sale of real property. The result will be
"bargain protection" which may not be in the best interest of home
buyers generally.
By limiting future recovery in negligence to only those situations
where more than solely economic loss has been incurred, the Illinois
Supreme Court has grasped at an approach which may be poorly suited
to the realities of the housing market and construction defects litigation, and has missed a chance to help resolve the continuing dispute
over the economic loss doctrine. The result of this new limitation will
be relegation of the occasional home buyer's suit with solely economic
loss to contract law when to do so is not clearly a superior way of dealing with the dispute, elimination of appropriate tort law provisions,
confusion in other areas of tort pleading in the law of real property,
160. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 I1. App. 3d 260, 427 N.E.2d 1337 (4th Dist. 1981).
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and the possible denial of protection to small investors in Illinois who
have chosen to invest in the housing market.

